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Public-key cryptosystems resilient to key leakage
Moni Naor
*
,
Gil Segev
*
Corresponding author for this work
Research output
:
Contribution to journal
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Article
›
peer-review
76
Scopus citations
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Keyphrases
1-bit
60%
6-bit
20%
Adversarial Model
20%
Baltimore
20%
CCA Security
40%
CCA1
20%
Chosen-ciphertext Attack
20%
Cold Boot Attack
20%
Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
40%
Cramer-Shoup Cryptosystem
20%
Cryptographic Scheme
20%
Cryptology
20%
Encryption Scheme
60%
Existing Buildings
20%
Generic Approach
20%
Generic Construction
40%
Hash Proof System
80%
Information Leakage
20%
Key Leakage
100%
Lattice-based
20%
Paillier
20%
Physical Implementation
20%
Public Key Cryptosystem
100%
Public Key Encryption
20%
Public-key Encryption Schemes
20%
Quadratic Residuosity Assumption
20%
Resilient
100%
San Francisco
20%
San Jose
20%
Santa Barbara
20%
Secret Key
40%
Side-channel Attacks
60%
Systems-based
20%
Theory of Computing
20%
Theory of Cryptography
20%
Computer Science
Adversarial Model
25%
chosen ciphertext attack
25%
Cold Boot Attack
25%
Cryptography
25%
Cryptology
25%
Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange
50%
Encryption Scheme
75%
Information Leakage
25%
Physical Implementation
25%
Proof System
100%
Public-Key Cryptosystems
100%
public-key encryption
50%
side-channel
75%