Public projects, boolean functions, and the borders of border's theorem

Parikshit Gopalan, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Border's theorem gives an intuitive linear characterization of the feasible interim allocation rules of a Bayesian single-item environment, and it has several applications in economic and algorithmic mechanism design. All known generalizations of Border's theorem either restrict attention to relatively simple settings or resort to approximation. This article identifies a complexity-theoretic barrier that indicates, assuming standard complexity class separations, that Border's theorem cannot be extended significantly beyond the state of the art.We also identify a surprisingly tight connection between Myerson's optimal auction theory, when applied to public project settings, and some fundamental results in the analysis of Boolean functions.

Original languageAmerican English
Article number18
JournalACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume6
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Association for Computing Machinery.

Keywords

  • Auctions
  • Border's theorem
  • Correlated values
  • Interdependence
  • Myerson theory
  • Optimal auctions
  • Prior-independence
  • Revenue-maximization

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