Raising capital from heterogeneous investors†

Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer, Eyal Winter

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

A firm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project succeeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the firm offers payments contingent on success. We study the firm’s optimal unique-implementation scheme, namely the scheme that guarantees the firm the maximum payoff. This scheme treats investors differently based on size. We show that if the distribution of the investment threshold is log-concave, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in investor size increases the firm’s payoff. Our analysis highlights strategic risk as an important potential driver of inequality.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)889-921
Number of pages33
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume110
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2020

Bibliographical note

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© 2020 American Economic Association. All rights reserved.

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