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ReAct: Reflection Attack Mitigation For Asymmetric Routing

  • David Hay*
  • , Mary Hogan
  • , Shir Landau Feibish
  • *Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Amplification Reflection Distributed Denial-of-Service (AR-DDoS) attacks remain a formidable threat, exploiting stateless protocols to flood victims with illegitimate traffic. Recent advances have enabled data-plane defenses against such attacks, but existing solutions typically assume symmetric routing and are limited to a single switch. These assumptions fail in modern networks where asymmetry is common, resulting in dropped legitimate responses and persistent connectivity issues. This paper presents ReAct, an in-network defense for AR-DDoS that is robust to asymmetry. ReAct performs request-response correlation across switches using programmable data planes and a sliding-window of Bloom filters. To handle asymmetric traffic, ReAct introduces a data-plane-based request forwarding mechanism, enabling switches to validate responses even when paths differ. ReAct can automatically adapt to routing changes with minimal intervention, ensuring continued protection even in dynamic network environments. We implemented ReAct on both a P4 interpreter and NVIDIA's BlueField-3, demonstrating its applicability across multiple platforms. Evaluation results show that ReAct filters nearly all attack traffic without dropping legitimate responses-even under high-volume attacks and asymmetry. Compared to state-of-the-art approaches, ReAct achieves significantly lower false positives. To our knowledge, ReAct is the first data-plane AR-DDoS defense that supports dynamic, cross-switch collaboration, making it uniquely suitable for deployment in networks with asymmetry.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationINFOCOM 2026 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9798331549619
DOIs
StatePublished - 2026
Event2026 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2026 - Tokyo, Japan
Duration: 18 May 202621 May 2026

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
ISSN (Print)0743-166X

Conference

Conference2026 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2026
Country/TerritoryJapan
CityTokyo
Period18/05/2621/05/26

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 IEEE.

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