Abstract
We introduce Real Candidacy Games (RCGs)-A novel strategic candidacy model, where candidates have a continuous range of positions that affect their attractiveness for voters. We also allow candidates to have their own non-Trivial preferences over the candidate set. We study RCGs with restricted and unrestricted positioning strategies to establish conditions for Nash Equilibrium (NE) existence. That is, we investigate under what voting rules and tie- breaking schemes, a stable candidate positioning exists. While for several voting rule classes (e.g., Condorcet-Consistent) we obtain positive results, we also show that for some scoring rules there are examples without a NE for an arbitrarily large number of voters.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 |
| Editors | Sanmay Das, Edmund Durfee, Kate Larson, Michael Winikoff |
| Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |
| Pages | 867-875 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781510855076 |
| State | Published - 2017 |
| Event | 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, Brazil Duration: 8 May 2017 → 12 May 2017 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2 |
| ISSN (Print) | 1548-8403 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1558-2914 |
Conference
| Conference | 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Brazil |
| City | Sao Paulo |
| Period | 8/05/17 → 12/05/17 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© Copyright 2017, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
Keywords
- Candidacy games
- Hotelling-downs model
- Social choice