Reasoning with Comparative Moral Judgements: An Argument for Moral Bayesianism

Ittay Nissan-Rozen

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-58507-9_6

Reasoning with Comparative Moral Judgements: An Argument for Moral Bayesianism

Ittay Nissan-Rozen^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Philosophy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The paper discusses the notion of reasoning with comparative moral judgements (i.e. judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) from the point of view of several meta-ethical positions. Using a simple formal result, it is argued that only a version of moral cognitivism that is committed to the claim that moral beliefs come in degrees can give a normatively plausible account of such reasoning. Some implications of accepting such a version of moral cognitivism are discussed.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning
Publisher	Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Pages	113-136
Number of pages	24
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58507-9_6
State	Published - 2017

Publication series

Name	Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning
Volume	14
ISSN (Print)	2214-9120
ISSN (Electronic)	2214-9139

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017.

Keywords

Commutativity
Conditionalization
Moral bayesianism
Moral reasoning
Moral uncertainty
The lottery paradox

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10.1007/978-3-319-58507-9_6

Cite this

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Reasoning with Comparative Moral Judgements: An Argument for Moral Bayesianism

Abstract

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Keywords

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