Reasoning with Comparative Moral Judgements: An Argument for Moral Bayesianism

Ittay Nissan-Rozen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

The paper discusses the notion of reasoning with comparative moral judgements (i.e. judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) from the point of view of several meta-ethical positions. Using a simple formal result, it is argued that only a version of moral cognitivism that is committed to the claim that moral beliefs come in degrees can give a normatively plausible account of such reasoning. Some implications of accepting such a version of moral cognitivism are discussed.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationLogic, Argumentation and Reasoning
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Pages113-136
Number of pages24
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017

Publication series

NameLogic, Argumentation and Reasoning
Volume14
ISSN (Print)2214-9120
ISSN (Electronic)2214-9139

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017.

Keywords

  • Commutativity
  • Conditionalization
  • Moral bayesianism
  • Moral reasoning
  • Moral uncertainty
  • The lottery paradox

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