Regional blocks and international relations: Economic groupings or political hegemons?

Alfred Tovias*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

Several years ago this author predicted that the success of the Uruguay Round would not mean that the move towards the consolidation of trading blocks would be stopped, only that the move would be slower. A scenario of confrontation would rapidly develop if any of the two existing or potential trading blocks (the EC/EEA and the US/NAFTA1) should, first, lose interest in the multilateral process of negotiation; second, become an entity which systematically excludes would-be candidates from joining in new initiatives; third, maintain or increase the average level of protection against non-members; fourth, resort to bilateral reciprocity for the granting of trade concessions; fifth, impose unilaterally retaliatory measures and resort to threats; or sixth, discriminate against foreign producers within the block.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationStrange Power
Subtitle of host publicationShaping the Parameters of International Relations and International Political Economy
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages321-341
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)9781351740456
ISBN (Print)9781138733688
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Thomas C. Lawton, James N. Rosenau, Amy C. Verdun 2000. All rights reserved.

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