Regulating an observable M/M/1 queue

Moshe Haviv; Binyamin Oz

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2016.01.002

Regulating an observable M/M/1 queue

Moshe Haviv, Binyamin Oz^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Business Administration

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Naor (1969) was the first to observe that in observable queues, customers' joining behavior may not coincide with the socially optimal one. The question then is how to regulate the system such that customers, while minding their own utility, will decide to join only when it is advised by society. After reviewing some existing mechanisms (some involving money transfers and some not), we suggest novel ones that do not involve money transfers and possess some advantages over the existing ones.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	196-198
Number of pages	3
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	44
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.01.002
State	Published - Mar 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords

Observable queue
Regulation of a queue
Strategic behavior in queue

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10.1016/j.orl.2016.01.002

Cite this

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Regulating an observable M/M/1 queue

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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