TY - JOUR
T1 - Relational dynamics under close supervision
T2 - Examining transnational cooperation in regulatory oversight
AU - Bravo-Laguna, Carlos
AU - Levi-Faur, David
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 The Author(s). Governance published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - The increasing institutionalization of regulatory oversight worldwide has not resulted in the creation of numerous formal channels of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Despite its puzzling nature, this circumstance has barely attracted scholarly attention. Additionally, the study of cooperation across transgovernmental regulatory networks with actors having low autonomy from central governments remains under-researched. We fill these literature gaps by applying insights from the policy networks literature to identify drivers of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Combining Exponential Random Graph Models with semi-structured interviews, we show that commonalities in administrative traditions drive cooperation. Innovative bodies become sources of best practices. Conversely, exchanges between countries with similar regulatory oversight settings or preferences are rare, perhaps due to their low independence from their political principals. These results suggest that regulatory oversight actors use relational opportunities and general country features as cues for transnational cooperation, instead of adopting strategic partnerships with better matches.
AB - The increasing institutionalization of regulatory oversight worldwide has not resulted in the creation of numerous formal channels of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Despite its puzzling nature, this circumstance has barely attracted scholarly attention. Additionally, the study of cooperation across transgovernmental regulatory networks with actors having low autonomy from central governments remains under-researched. We fill these literature gaps by applying insights from the policy networks literature to identify drivers of transnational regulatory oversight cooperation. Combining Exponential Random Graph Models with semi-structured interviews, we show that commonalities in administrative traditions drive cooperation. Innovative bodies become sources of best practices. Conversely, exchanges between countries with similar regulatory oversight settings or preferences are rare, perhaps due to their low independence from their political principals. These results suggest that regulatory oversight actors use relational opportunities and general country features as cues for transnational cooperation, instead of adopting strategic partnerships with better matches.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85199877316&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/gove.12892
DO - 10.1111/gove.12892
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AN - SCOPUS:85199877316
SN - 0952-1895
VL - 38
JO - Governance
JF - Governance
IS - 2
M1 - e12892
ER -