Abstract
Subjects are reluctant to vaccinate a (hypothetical) child when the vaccination itself can cause death, even when this is much less likely than death from the disease prevented. This effect is even greater when there is a ‘risk group’ for death (with its overall probability held constant), even though the test for membership in the risk group is unavailable. This effect cannot be explained in terms of a tendency to assume that the child is in the risk group. A risk group for death from the disease has no effect on reluctance to vaccinate. The reluctance is an example of omission bias (Spranca, Minsk & Baron, in press), an overgeneralization of a distinction between commissions and omissions to a case in which it is irrelevant. Likewise, it would ordinarily be prudent to find out whether a child is in a risk group before acting, but in this case it is impossible, so knowledge of the existence of the risk group is irrelevant. The risk‐group effect is consistent with Frisch & Baron's (1988) interpretation of ambiguity.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 263-277 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Journal of Behavioral Decision Making |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1990 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Ambiguity
- Omission bias
- Vaccination
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