Abstract
Rebuts L. Lopes's normative objections to expected utility theory and analyzes the "fallacy of large numbers," discussed by P. A. Samuelson (1963), from both mathematical and psychological standpoints. It is suggested that values in risky decisions are gains and losses defined relative to some reference point. Because the value function tends to be concave for gains and convex for losses, the shift of the reference point can produce systematic reversals of preferences. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 713-717 |
Number of pages | 5 |
Journal | Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 1983 |
Keywords
- analysis of P. A. Samuelson's theorem
- mathematical vs psychological perspectives, decision making under risk, criticism of L. Lopes's article &