Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Scopus citations


We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first).

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)997-1026
Number of pages30
JournalInternational Economic Review
Issue number3
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2016

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© (2016) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association


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