RULE RATIONALITY

Yuval Heller; Eyal Winter

doi:10.1111/iere.12183

RULE RATIONALITY

Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first).

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	997-1026
Number of pages	30
Journal	International Economic Review
Volume	57
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12183
State	Published - 1 Aug 2016

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Publisher Copyright:
© (2016) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

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10.1111/iere.12183

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RULE RATIONALITY

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