Second-order equality and levelling down

Re'em Segev*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Many think that equality is an intrinsic value. However, this view, especially when based on a consequential foundation, faces familiar objections related to the claim that equality is sometimes good for none and bad for some: most notably the levelling down objection. This article explores a unique (consequential) conception of equality, as part of a more general conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, which is not exposed to these objections.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)425-443
Number of pages19
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume87
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2009

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