Self-regulation of an unobservable queue

Moshe Haviv, Binyamin Oz

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider an unobservable M/M/1 queue where customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. It is well known that left to themselves, in equilibrium, customers join the queue at a rate higher than is socially optimal. Hence, regulation schemes, under which the resulting equilibrium joining rate coincides with the socially optimal one, should be considered. We suggest a classification of regulation schemes based on a few desired properties and use it to classify schemes from the existing literature. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing schemes possesses all of the properties, and in this paper we suggest such a scheme. Its novelty is in assigning random priorities to customers, prior to their decision whether to join or balk. We also introduce variations of this regulation scheme as well as others that are also based on randomization.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)2380-2389
Number of pages10
JournalManagement Science
Volume64
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2018
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 INFORMS.

Keywords

  • Preemptive random priority
  • Regulation of a queue
  • Strategic behavior in queue

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Self-regulation of an unobservable queue'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this