TY - JOUR
T1 - Selling spectrum in the presence of shared networks
T2 - The case of the Israeli 5G auction
AU - Blumrosen, Liad
AU - Solan, Eilon
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2023/3
Y1 - 2023/3
N2 - The Israeli 5G auction that took place in August 2020 used the Combinatorial Clock Auction mechanism adapted to the Israeli market. We review the challenges that the Israeli Ministry of Communication faced while designing the auction and discuss the strategic consequences of the design. We highlight the special characteristics of the Israeli telecommunication market and, in particular, the fact that most operators share their antenna networks and their spectrum assets with other auction participants, but spectrum licenses need to be purchased by each operator individually. The Israeli Ministry of Communication required operators sharing the same networks to submit joint bids in the auction. We discuss the implications of this decision on the efficiency of the auction, and the difficulties it caused the bidders. We discuss the effect of further incentive schemes that accompanied the auction, and we also describe some signaling opportunities that emerged during the auction process.
AB - The Israeli 5G auction that took place in August 2020 used the Combinatorial Clock Auction mechanism adapted to the Israeli market. We review the challenges that the Israeli Ministry of Communication faced while designing the auction and discuss the strategic consequences of the design. We highlight the special characteristics of the Israeli telecommunication market and, in particular, the fact that most operators share their antenna networks and their spectrum assets with other auction participants, but spectrum licenses need to be purchased by each operator individually. The Israeli Ministry of Communication required operators sharing the same networks to submit joint bids in the auction. We discuss the implications of this decision on the efficiency of the auction, and the difficulties it caused the bidders. We discuss the effect of further incentive schemes that accompanied the auction, and we also describe some signaling opportunities that emerged during the auction process.
KW - Auctions
KW - Joint-bid agreements
KW - Shared networks
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85147847574&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102481
DO - 10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102481
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AN - SCOPUS:85147847574
SN - 0308-5961
VL - 47
JO - Telecommunications Policy
JF - Telecommunications Policy
IS - 2
M1 - 102481
ER -