Semantic Representation of Meaning: A Critique

The representational view of mind is examined by focusing on what is perhaps its key tenet, namely, that semantic representations serve as the basis for the knowledge of meaning and for the production and comprehension of linguistic expressions. The argument marshalled against this view is twofold and involves conceptual and methodological, empirical, procedural, and developmental considerations. First, I invoke contextual considerations to mark the limitations of the standard account of the representation of meaning. Second, I point out the inadequacy of a two-stage model based on the distinction between standard and nonstandard meaning. I conclude that semantic representations are the products of cognitive activity, not the basis for it. Rather than serving as the general framework for such activity, they are associated with particular, advanced stages of it that are generally characterized by a degree of autonomy from context and from the agent's action in the world. Alternatives to the representational framework are explored.