Abstract
Thomas Aquinas thinks, in agreement with Cicero and Aristotle, that friends typically will the same things. If this is so, how can we, given our very imperfect knowledge of God’s will, be His friends? I argue that for Aquinas, when we are unable to grasp any goodness in the object of God’s will, friendship does not require from us to will what we know God wills. Willing what God wills without grasping the goodness present in the willed thing—would that be at all possible—fails to increase our likeness to God and harms, rather than contributes to friendship. Aquinas does not drop conformity of wills as a requirement of friendship but believes that we should not aspire to more conformity of wills than it is humanly possible to achieve.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 403-419 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Philosophy and Theology |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| State | Published - 2003 |