Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods

Parimal Kanti Bag*, Eyal Winter

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Scopus citations


For excludable public goods, we propose simple mechanisms to uniquely implement a (core) stable and efficient production and cost-sharing outcome: consumers are asked to announce sequentially their minimal requested level of public good and a subscription towards its production. In one mechanism the subscriptions depend on the order of moves. In a second mechanism, the subscriptions are order-independent and thus symmetric. The equilibrium outcomes induced by our mechanisms are immune to strategic deviations by coalitions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H41, C72, D78.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)72-94
Number of pages23
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jul 1999

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
* Financial support to the second author from the German Israeli Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions on an earlier version. Comments from Bhaskar Dutta and participants at the 1997 Econometric Society European Meetings in Toulouse are also appreciated. Responsibilities of any errors or omissions remain with the authors.


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