TY - JOUR
T1 - Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
AU - Foster, Dean P.
AU - Hart, Sergiu
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2018/5
Y1 - 2018/5
N2 - We propose to smooth out the calibration score, which measures how good a forecaster is, by combining nearby forecasts. While regular calibration can be guaranteed only by randomized forecasting procedures, we show that smooth calibration can be guaranteed by deterministic procedures. As a consequence, it does not matter if the forecasts are leaked, i.e., made known in advance: smooth calibration can nevertheless be guaranteed (while regular calibration cannot). Moreover, our procedure has finite recall, is stationary, and all forecasts lie on a finite grid. To construct the procedure, we deal also with the related setups of online linear regression and weak calibration. Finally, we show that smooth calibration yields uncoupled finite-memory dynamics in n-person games—“smooth calibrated learning”—in which the players play approximate Nash equilibria in almost all periods (by contrast, calibrated learning, which uses regular calibration, yields only that the time-averages of play are approximate correlated equilibria).
AB - We propose to smooth out the calibration score, which measures how good a forecaster is, by combining nearby forecasts. While regular calibration can be guaranteed only by randomized forecasting procedures, we show that smooth calibration can be guaranteed by deterministic procedures. As a consequence, it does not matter if the forecasts are leaked, i.e., made known in advance: smooth calibration can nevertheless be guaranteed (while regular calibration cannot). Moreover, our procedure has finite recall, is stationary, and all forecasts lie on a finite grid. To construct the procedure, we deal also with the related setups of online linear regression and weak calibration. Finally, we show that smooth calibration yields uncoupled finite-memory dynamics in n-person games—“smooth calibrated learning”—in which the players play approximate Nash equilibria in almost all periods (by contrast, calibrated learning, which uses regular calibration, yields only that the time-averages of play are approximate correlated equilibria).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85056317514&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.022
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.022
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AN - SCOPUS:85056317514
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 109
SP - 271
EP - 293
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -