Special Protection for Cleaners: A Case of Justified Selectivity

In a recent article I have argued that a new balance has to be struck between universalism and selectivity in labor law. The current Article seeks to examine in more detail one particular aspect of this balance: the addition of selective regulations as a method of offering special protection to groups that are especially vulnerable. I use the context of the Israeli cleaning sector as a case-study. Workers in this sector are usually employed through contractors (indirectly), which has led to some unique vulnerabilities. The article considers three selective regulations introduced in this sector in recent years, all aimed at offering more protection to this group: judicial judgments concerning the right to severance payment, creating different rules for cleaners; the Act to Improve the Enforcement of Labor Laws, which created incentives for users' "clients" to ensure compliance by cleaning contractors; and new legislation that gives cleaners in the public sector a right to a minimum wage and other benefits somewhat above the minimum required by universal laws. Based on the analysis of these regulations and the particular context, I conclude with some proposals and some reservations about the appropriate use of selectivity in labor law.