TY - JOUR
T1 - Stability vs. no justified envy
AU - Romm, Assaf
AU - Roth, Alvin E.
AU - Shorrer, Ran I.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024
PY - 2024/11
Y1 - 2024/11
N2 - Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.
AB - Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85206932483&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002
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AN - SCOPUS:85206932483
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 148
SP - 357
EP - 366
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -