Stability vs. no justified envy

Assaf Romm; Alvin E. Roth; Ran I. Shorrer

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002

Stability vs. no justified envy

Assaf Romm^*
, Alvin E. Roth
, Ran I. Shorrer

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	357-366
Number of pages	10
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	148
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002
State	Published - Nov 2024

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© 2024

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10.1016/j.geb.2024.10.002

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AB - Stability and “no justified envy” are used almost synonymously in the matching theory literature. However, they are conceptually different and have logically separate properties. We generalize the definition of justified envy to environments with arbitrary school preferences, feasibility constraints, and contracts, and show that stable allocations may admit justified envy. When choice functions are substitutable, the outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm is both stable and admits no justified envy.

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Stability vs. no justified envy

Abstract

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