Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue

Raneetha Abeywickrama; Moshe Haviv; Binyamin Oz; Ilze Ziedins

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2019.02.004

Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue

Raneetha Abeywickrama^*, Moshe Haviv, Binyamin Oz, Ilze Ziedins

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider an unobservable M/G/1 accumulating priority queue where homogeneous customers choose one of a finite number of priority classes. We show that there are either one or two pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In the latter case they are two consecutive classes and there exists an equilibrium strategy mixing between these two classes. We find the best-response function and show that it is unimodal, with follow-the-crowd and avoid-the-crowd instances.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	162-167
Number of pages	6
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	47
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.02.004
State	Published - May 2019
Externally published	Yes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Raneetha Abeywickrama is funded by a University of Auckland, New Zealand Doctoral Scholarship. This research was partly supported by Israel Science Foundation grant no. 511/15 , Te Pūnaha Matatini and Marsden Fund, New Zealand grant UOA1114 .

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

Accumulating priority queue
Equilibrium strategies
Strategic behavior in queues

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10.1016/j.orl.2019.02.004

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title = "Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue",

abstract = "We consider an unobservable M/G/1 accumulating priority queue where homogeneous customers choose one of a finite number of priority classes. We show that there are either one or two pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In the latter case they are two consecutive classes and there exists an equilibrium strategy mixing between these two classes. We find the best-response function and show that it is unimodal, with follow-the-crowd and avoid-the-crowd instances.",

keywords = "Accumulating priority queue, Equilibrium strategies, Strategic behavior in queues",

author = "Raneetha Abeywickrama and Moshe Haviv and Binyamin Oz and Ilze Ziedins",

note = "Funding Information: Raneetha Abeywickrama is funded by a University of Auckland, New Zealand Doctoral Scholarship. This research was partly supported by Israel Science Foundation grant no. 511/15 , Te Pūnaha Matatini and Marsden Fund, New Zealand grant UOA1114 . Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 Elsevier B.V.",

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doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2019.02.004",

language = "American English",

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T1 - Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue

AU - Abeywickrama, Raneetha

AU - Haviv, Moshe

AU - Oz, Binyamin

AU - Ziedins, Ilze

N1 - Funding Information: Raneetha Abeywickrama is funded by a University of Auckland, New Zealand Doctoral Scholarship. This research was partly supported by Israel Science Foundation grant no. 511/15 , Te Pūnaha Matatini and Marsden Fund, New Zealand grant UOA1114 . Publisher Copyright: © 2019 Elsevier B.V.

PY - 2019/5

Y1 - 2019/5

N2 - We consider an unobservable M/G/1 accumulating priority queue where homogeneous customers choose one of a finite number of priority classes. We show that there are either one or two pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In the latter case they are two consecutive classes and there exists an equilibrium strategy mixing between these two classes. We find the best-response function and show that it is unimodal, with follow-the-crowd and avoid-the-crowd instances.

AB - We consider an unobservable M/G/1 accumulating priority queue where homogeneous customers choose one of a finite number of priority classes. We show that there are either one or two pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In the latter case they are two consecutive classes and there exists an equilibrium strategy mixing between these two classes. We find the best-response function and show that it is unimodal, with follow-the-crowd and avoid-the-crowd instances.

KW - Accumulating priority queue

KW - Equilibrium strategies

KW - Strategic behavior in queues

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U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.02.004

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.02.004

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85062892861

SN - 0167-6377

VL - 47

SP - 162

EP - 167

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

IS - 3

ER -

Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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