We consider an unobservable M/G/1 accumulating priority queue where homogeneous customers choose one of a finite number of priority classes. We show that there are either one or two pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In the latter case they are two consecutive classes and there exists an equilibrium strategy mixing between these two classes. We find the best-response function and show that it is unimodal, with follow-the-crowd and avoid-the-crowd instances.
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
Raneetha Abeywickrama is funded by a University of Auckland, New Zealand Doctoral Scholarship. This research was partly supported by Israel Science Foundation grant no. 511/15 , Te Pūnaha Matatini and Marsden Fund, New Zealand grant UOA1114 .
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.
- Accumulating priority queue
- Equilibrium strategies
- Strategic behavior in queues