Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue

Raneetha Abeywickrama*, Moshe Haviv, Binyamin Oz, Ilze Ziedins

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider an unobservable M/G/1 accumulating priority queue where homogeneous customers choose one of a finite number of priority classes. We show that there are either one or two pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In the latter case they are two consecutive classes and there exists an equilibrium strategy mixing between these two classes. We find the best-response function and show that it is unimodal, with follow-the-crowd and avoid-the-crowd instances.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)162-167
Number of pages6
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume47
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2019
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.

Keywords

  • Accumulating priority queue
  • Equilibrium strategies
  • Strategic behavior in queues

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