TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategic bidding in a discrete accumulating priority queue
AU - Abeywickrama, Raneetha
AU - Haviv, Moshe
AU - Oz, Binyamin
AU - Ziedins, Ilze
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2019/5
Y1 - 2019/5
N2 - We consider an unobservable M/G/1 accumulating priority queue where homogeneous customers choose one of a finite number of priority classes. We show that there are either one or two pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In the latter case they are two consecutive classes and there exists an equilibrium strategy mixing between these two classes. We find the best-response function and show that it is unimodal, with follow-the-crowd and avoid-the-crowd instances.
AB - We consider an unobservable M/G/1 accumulating priority queue where homogeneous customers choose one of a finite number of priority classes. We show that there are either one or two pure Nash equilibrium strategies. In the latter case they are two consecutive classes and there exists an equilibrium strategy mixing between these two classes. We find the best-response function and show that it is unimodal, with follow-the-crowd and avoid-the-crowd instances.
KW - Accumulating priority queue
KW - Equilibrium strategies
KW - Strategic behavior in queues
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85062892861&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.02.004
DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2019.02.004
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AN - SCOPUS:85062892861
SN - 0167-6377
VL - 47
SP - 162
EP - 167
JO - Operations Research Letters
JF - Operations Research Letters
IS - 3
ER -