Abstract
The purpose of this article is to introduce the reader to the topic of strategic behavior of customers in queues. We assume that customers individually decide on issues such as whether or not to join the queue, whether or not to renege from a queue after waiting for a while, or whether or not to pay some fee in order to belong to a higher priority class. For some examples, we define the appropriate noncooperative games and look for their Nash equilibria. We restrict ourselves to M/M/1 queues with homogeneous customers (with respect to their cost/reward parameters).
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Wiley Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science |
| Publisher | wiley |
| Pages | 1-12 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780470400531 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780470400630 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Jan 2010 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords
- M/M/1 queue
- Nash equilibrium
- single server queue
- symmetric strategy profile
- threshold strategies