Strategic Entropy and Complexity in Repeated Games

Abraham Neyman*, Daijiro Okada

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce the entropy-based measure of uncertainty for mixed strategies of repeated games - strategic entropy. We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of player 1's strategies while player 2 is unrestricted, as the bound grows to infinity. We apply the results thus obtained to study the asymptotic behavior of the value of the repeated games with finite automata and bounded recall. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C72.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)191-223
Number of pages33
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume29
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1999

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Strategic Entropy and Complexity in Repeated Games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this