Strategic voting with incomplete information

Ulle Endriss, Svetlana Obraztsova, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

22 Scopus citations


Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding the preferences of the other voters. In reality, however, voters only have incomplete information, which limits their ability to manipulate. We explore how these limitations affect both the manipulability of voting rules and the dynamics of systems in which voters may repeatedly update their own vote in reaction to the moves made by others. We focus on the Plurality, Veto, k-approval, Borda, Copeland, and Maximin voting rules, and consider several types of information that are natural in the context of these rules, namely information on the current front-runner, on the scores obtained by each alternative, and on the majority graph induced by the individual preferences.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)236-242
Number of pages7
JournalIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
StatePublished - 2016
Event25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2016 - New York, United States
Duration: 9 Jul 201615 Jul 2016

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work has been partly supported by COST Action IC1205 on Computational Social Choice, by Israel Science Foundation grant number #1227/12, and by the Israeli Center of Research Excellence in Algorithms (I-CORE-ALGO)


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