Strategyproof classification with shared inputs

Reshef Meir*, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

10 Scopus citations


Strategyproof classification deals with a setting where a decision-maker must classify a set of input points with binary labels, while minimizing the expected error. The labels of the input points are reported by self-interested agents, who might lie in order to obtain a classifier that more closely matches their own labels, thus creating a bias in the data; this motivates the design of truthful mechanisms that discourage false reports. Previous work [Meir et al., 2008] investigated both decision-theoretic and learning-theoretic variations of the setting, but only considered classifiers that belong to a degenerate class. In this paper we assume that the agents are interested in a shared set of input points. We show that this plausible assumption leads to powerful results. In particular, we demonstrate that variations of a truthful random dictator mechanism can guarantee approximately optimal outcomes with respect to any class of classifiers.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationIJCAI-09 - Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781577354260
StatePublished - 2009
Event21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2009 - Pasadena, United States
Duration: 11 Jul 200916 Jul 2009

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1045-0823


Conference21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2009
Country/TerritoryUnited States


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