Structural representations and the brain

Oron Shagrir*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

42 Scopus citations

Abstract

In Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey suggests that the notion of structural representation is posited by classical theories of cognition, but not by the 'newer accounts' (e.g. connectionist modeling). I challenge the assertion about the newer accounts. I argue that the newer accounts also posit structural representations; in fact, the notion plays a key theoretical role in the current computational approaches in cognitive neuroscience. The argument rests on a close examination of computational work on the oculomotor system.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)519-545
Number of pages27
JournalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Volume63
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2012

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Bechtel, Eli Dresner, Frances Egan, Paul Humphries, Hilla Jacobson, Arnon Levy, Bob Matthews, Etye Steinberg, Eran Tal, and three anonymous referees of this Journal, for their comments, suggestions and corrections. This work is funded by Israel Science Foundation (grant 725/08).

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