Subsidies, stability, and restricted cooperation in coalitional games

Reshef Meir, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Enrico Malizia

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

26 Scopus citations

Abstract

Cooperation among automated agents is becoming increasingly important in various artificial intelligence applications. Coalitional (i.e., cooperative) game theory supplies conceptual and mathematical tools useful in the analysis of such interactions, and in particular in the achievement of stable outcomes among self-interested agents. Here, we study the minimal external subsidy required to stabilize the core of a coalitional game. Following the Cost of Stability (CoS) model introduced by Bachrach et al. [2009a], we give tight bounds on the required subsidy under various restrictions on the social structure of the game. We then compare the extended core induced by subsidies with the least core of the game, proving tight bounds on the ratio between the minimal subsidy and the minimal demand relaxation that each lead to stability.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationIJCAI 2011 - 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Pages301-306
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Event22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2011 - Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain
Duration: 16 Jul 201122 Jul 2011

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2011
Country/TerritorySpain
CityBarcelona, Catalonia
Period16/07/1122/07/11

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