Suppressing BGP Zombies with Route Status Transparency

Yosef Edery Anahory, Jie Kong, Nicholas Scaglione, Justin Furuness, Hemi Leibowitz, Amir Herzberg, Bing Wang, Yossi Gilad

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Withdrawal suppression has been a known weakness of BGP for over a decade. It has a significant detrimental impact on both the reliability and security of inter-domain routing on the Internet. This paper presents Route Status Transparency (RoST), the first design that efficiently and securely thwarts withdrawal suppression misconfigurations and attacks. RoST allows ASes to efficiently verify whether a route has been withdrawn; it is compatible with BGP as well as with BGP security enhancements. We use simulations on the Internet's AS-level topology to evaluate the benefits from adopting RoST. We use an extensive real-world BGP announcements dataset to show that it is efficient in terms of storage, bandwidth, and computational requirements.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 22nd USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, NSDI 2025
PublisherUSENIX Association
Pages1349-1366
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9781939133465
StatePublished - 2025
Event22nd USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, NSDI 2025 - Philadelphia, United States
Duration: 28 Apr 202530 Apr 2025

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 22nd USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, NSDI 2025

Conference

Conference22nd USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, NSDI 2025
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPhiladelphia
Period28/04/2530/04/25

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 by The USENIX Association All Rights Reserved.

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