TY - GEN
T1 - Synthesis from component libraries with costs
AU - Avni, Guy
AU - Kupferman, Orna
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - Synthesis is the automated construction of a system from its specification. In real life, hardware and software systems are rarely constructed from scratch. Rather, a system is typically constructed from a library of components. Lustig and Vardi formalized this intuition and studied LTL synthesis from component libraries. In real life, designers seek optimal systems. In this paper we add optimality considerations to the setting. We distinguish between quality considerations (for example, size - the smaller a system is, the better it is), and pricing (for example, the payment to the company who manufactured the component). We study the problem of designing systems with minimal quality-cost and price. A key point is that while the quality cost is individual - the choices of a designer are independent of choices made by other designers that use the same library, pricing gives rise to a resource-allocation game - designers that use the same component share its price, with the share being proportional to the number of uses (a component can be used several times in a design). We study both closed and open settings, and in both we solve the problem of finding an optimal design. In a setting with multiple designers, we also study the game-theoretic problems of the induced resource-allocation game.
AB - Synthesis is the automated construction of a system from its specification. In real life, hardware and software systems are rarely constructed from scratch. Rather, a system is typically constructed from a library of components. Lustig and Vardi formalized this intuition and studied LTL synthesis from component libraries. In real life, designers seek optimal systems. In this paper we add optimality considerations to the setting. We distinguish between quality considerations (for example, size - the smaller a system is, the better it is), and pricing (for example, the payment to the company who manufactured the component). We study the problem of designing systems with minimal quality-cost and price. A key point is that while the quality cost is individual - the choices of a designer are independent of choices made by other designers that use the same library, pricing gives rise to a resource-allocation game - designers that use the same component share its price, with the share being proportional to the number of uses (a component can be used several times in a design). We study both closed and open settings, and in both we solve the problem of finding an optimal design. In a setting with multiple designers, we also study the game-theoretic problems of the induced resource-allocation game.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84906761682&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-662-44584-6_12
DO - 10.1007/978-3-662-44584-6_12
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AN - SCOPUS:84906761682
SN - 9783662445839
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 156
EP - 172
BT - Concurrency Theory - 25th International Conference, CONCUR 2014, Proceedings
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 25th International Conference on Concurrency Theory, CONCUR 2014
Y2 - 2 September 2014 through 5 September 2014
ER -