SYSTEMATICITY AND SKEPTICISM

Aaron Segal*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The fact that philosophy is systematic—that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected—was a commonplace among nineteenth century idealists, then neglected by analytic philosophers throughout much of the twentieth century, and has now finally started to get some renewed attention. But other than calling attention to the fact, few philosophers have tried to say what it consists in, or what its implications are. I argue that the systematicity of philosophy has disastrous epistemological implications. In particular, it implies philosophical skepticism: philosophers are rationally prohibited from believing any philosophical thesis. The argument goes by way of a new principle that connects inquiry with what is rational to believe. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between my argument and other, more well-trodden arguments for philosophical skepticism.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)1-18
Number of pages18
JournalAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Volume61
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2024

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 University of Illinois Press. All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Keywords skepticism
  • inquiry
  • metaphilosophical skepticism
  • systematicity
  • zetetic norm

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