Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism

David Enoch*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Book/ReportBookpeer-review

496 Scopus citations

Abstract

This book develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view - according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral, and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths - is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into full-fledged arguments. And when the book turns defensive - defending Robust Realism against traditional objections - it mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections. The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously. The positive arguments developed here - the argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths, and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence) - are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying, pre-theoretical motivations for the view.

Original languageAmerican English
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages320
Volume9780199579969
ISBN (Electronic)9780191729010
ISBN (Print)9780199579969
DOIs
StatePublished - 22 Sep 2011

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© David Enoch 2011. All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Deliberation
  • Indispensability
  • Meta-normativity
  • Metaethics
  • Moral disagreement
  • Moral epistemology
  • Moral realism
  • Morality
  • Normativity
  • Objectivity
  • Robust realism

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this