The AND-OR game

Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for two identical items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to analyze this setting for a simple, yet highly interesting, AND-OR game, where one agent is single minded and the other is unit demand. We find a mixed equilibrium of this game and show that every other equilibrium admits the same expected allocation and payments. In addition, we study the equilibrium, highlighting the change in revenue and social welfare as a function of the players' valuations.

Original languageAmerican English
Article number1
JournalACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume5
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2016
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
Research by Avinatan Hassidim was supported in part by grants from the Israel Science Foundation (ISF) and the German Israel Foundation. Research by Haim Kaplan was supported in part by grants from the ISF, the U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), the Israeli Centers of Research Excellence (I-CORE) program (center no. 4/11), and the Google Inter-university Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions. Research by Yishay Mansour was supported in part by grants from the ISF, the BSF, the Israeli Ministry of Science, the I-CORE program (center no. 4/11), and the Google Inter-university Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions. Research by Noam Nisan was supported by grants from the ISF, the I-CORE program (center no. 4/11), and the Google Inter-university Center for Electronic Markets and Auctions.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 ACM.

Keywords

  • AND player
  • Auctions
  • Equilibrium
  • F. [theory of computation]: algorithmic game theory and mechanism design/market equilibriums
  • Theory

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