The AND-OR game

Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider a simple simultaneous first price auction for two identical items in a complete information setting. Our goal is to analyze this setting for a simple, yet highly interesting, AND-OR game, where one agent is single minded and the other is unit demand. We find a mixed equilibrium of this game and show that every other equilibrium admits the same expected allocation and payments. In addition, we study the equilibrium, highlighting the change in revenue and social welfare as a function of the players' valuations.

Original languageAmerican English
Article number1
JournalACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Issue number1
StatePublished - Nov 2016
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 ACM.


  • AND player
  • Auctions
  • Equilibrium
  • F. [theory of computation]: algorithmic game theory and mechanism design/market equilibriums
  • Theory


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