The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel for NTU Games

Gooni Orshan*, José M. Zarzuelo

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

A bilateral consistency principle is used to generalize the Nash bargaining solution to a new NTU solution concept. It coincides with the prekernel for TU games and can be formulated in terms of a generalized concept of excess. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)67-84
Number of pages18
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume32
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2000
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
1 The research reported in this paper was supported by a grant of the Comision Interministerial de Ceincia y Technologia of Spain, by the Gobierno Vasco (project PI 95/101), and by the Direcci6n General de Ensenanza, Superior del Ministerio de Educaci6n y Cultura of the Spanish Government (project PB96-0247). This work was done while Gooni Orshan was staying at Basque Country University.

Keywords

  • NTU games; consistency; Nash bargaining solution; prekernel

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