The bilateral consistent prekernel, the core, and NTU bankruptcy problems

Guni Orshan*, Federico Valenciano, José M. Zarzuelo

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

It is shown that the bilateral consistent prekernel, an NTU solution concept that generalizes the Nash bargaining solution by means of a principle of bilateral consistency, is nonempty and intersects the core for a sufficiently rich class of NTU games: the class of boundary separating games, also introduced here. A second contribution of-this paper is the NTU extension of the bankruptcy games introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985). These games, which provide a new approach for dealing with bargaining problems with claims, are shown to be boundary separating, so that the results apply.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)268-282
Number of pages15
JournalMathematics of Operations Research
Volume28
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2003

Keywords

  • Bankruptcy problems
  • Consistency
  • Core
  • NTU games
  • Nash solution
  • Prekernel

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