Abstract
It is shown that the bilateral consistent prekernel, an NTU solution concept that generalizes the Nash bargaining solution by means of a principle of bilateral consistency, is nonempty and intersects the core for a sufficiently rich class of NTU games: the class of boundary separating games, also introduced here. A second contribution of-this paper is the NTU extension of the bankruptcy games introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985). These games, which provide a new approach for dealing with bargaining problems with claims, are shown to be boundary separating, so that the results apply.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 268-282 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Mathematics of Operations Research |
Volume | 28 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2003 |
Keywords
- Bankruptcy problems
- Consistency
- Core
- NTU games
- Nash solution
- Prekernel