TY - GEN
T1 - The cascade auction - A mechanism for deterring collusion in auctions
AU - Feige, Uriel
AU - Kalai, Gil
AU - Tennenholtz, Moshe
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - We introduce a sealed bid auction of a single item in which the winner is chosen at random among the highest k bidders according to a fixed probability distribution, and the price for the chosen winner is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves price. We call such an auction a cascade auction. Our analysis suggests that this type of auction may give higher revenues compared to second price auction in cases of collusion.
AB - We introduce a sealed bid auction of a single item in which the winner is chosen at random among the highest k bidders according to a fixed probability distribution, and the price for the chosen winner is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves price. We call such an auction a cascade auction. Our analysis suggests that this type of auction may give higher revenues compared to second price auction in cases of collusion.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84893385357&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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AN - SCOPUS:84893385357
SN - 9781577356158
T3 - Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
SP - 313
EP - 319
BT - Proceedings of the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
T2 - 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2013
Y2 - 14 July 2013 through 18 July 2013
ER -