The Clarke Tax as a Consensus Mechanism Among Automated Agents

Eithan Ephrati, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

119 Scopus citations

Abstract

When autonomous agents attempt to coordinate action, it is often necessary that they reach some kind of consensus. Reaching such a consensus has traditionally been dealt with in the Distributed Artificial Intelligence literature via the mechanism of negotiation. Another alternative is to have agents bypass negotiation by using a voting mechanism; each agent expresses its preferences, and a group choice mechanism is used to select the result. Some choice mechanisms are better than others, and ideally we would like one that cannot be manipulated by an untruthful agent. One such non-manipulable choice mechanism is the Clarke tax [Clarke, 1971]. Though theoretically attractive, the Clarke tax presents a number of difficulties when one attempts to use it in a practical implementation. This paper examines how the Clarke tax could be used as an effective "preference revealer" in the domain of automated agents, reducing the need for explicit negotiation.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 9th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 1991
PublisherAAAI Press
Pages173-178
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)0262510596, 9780262510592
StatePublished - 1991
Event9th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 1991 - Anaheim, United States
Duration: 14 Jul 199119 Jul 1991

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 9th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 1991
Volume1

Conference

Conference9th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 1991
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityAnaheim
Period14/07/9119/07/91

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 1991, AAAI (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.

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