When autonomous agents attempt to coordinate action, it is often necessary that they reach some kind of consensus. Reaching such a consensus has traditionally been dealt with in the Distributed Artificial Intelligence literature via the mechanism of negotiation. Another alternative is to have agents bypass negotiation by using a voting mechanism; each agent expresses its preferences, and a group choice mechanism is used to select the result. Some choice mechanisms are better than others, and ideally we would like one that cannot be manipulated by an untruthful agent. One such non-manipulable choice mechanism is the Clarke tax [Clarke, 1971]. Though theoretically attractive, the Clarke tax presents a number of difficulties when one attempts to use it in a practical implementation. This paper examines how the Clarke tax could be used as an effective "preference revealer" in the domain of automated agents, reducing the need for explicit negotiation.
|Original language||American English|
|Title of host publication||Proceedings of the 9th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 1991|
|Number of pages||6|
|ISBN (Electronic)||0262510596, 9780262510592|
|State||Published - 1991|
|Event||9th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 1991 - Anaheim, United States|
Duration: 14 Jul 1991 → 19 Jul 1991
|Name||Proceedings of the 9th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 1991|
|Conference||9th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 1991|
|Period||14/07/91 → 19/07/91|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
This research has been partially supported by the Israel National Council for Research and Development (Grant 032-8284)) and by the Center for Science Absorption, Office of Aliya Absorption, the State of Israel.
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