In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying the approach suggested by S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell (1985, "The Potential: A New Approach to the Value in Multi-person Allocation Problems," Discussion Paper 1157, Harvard Institute for Economic Research) concerning the consistency property and the potential function. An axiomatic formulation of the values by this approach leads to two known values for coalition structure, namely, R. J. Aumann and J. H. Drèze's (1974, Int. J. Game Theory 3, 217-237) value (AD value) and G. Owen's (1977), "Values of Games with Priori Unions," in Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory (R. Heim and O. Moeschlin, Eds.), New York: Springer-Verlag) value for games with coalition structure.
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* I am most grateful to Sergiu Hart for discussions on this subject, and especially for pointing out the fact that the Aumann-Dreze value and the Myerson value admit a potential. I am also grateful to Guillermo Owen and Bezalel Peleg and an anonymous referee for some comments on an earlier version. The support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB 303 is gratefully acknowledged. 132