The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation

Eyal Winter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

50 Scopus citations

Abstract

A multi-person bargaining model based on sequential demands is studied for coalitional games with increasing returns to scale for cooperation. We show that for such games the (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior leads to a payoff distribution which approaches the Shapley value as the money unit approaches 0. Subgame consistency and strategic equilibria are the main tools used in the analysis. The model is then applied to study a problem of public good consumption.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)255-273
Number of pages19
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume4
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1994

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this