Abstract
We introduce and experiment the Fisherman's Game in which the application of economic theory leads to four different benchmarks. Non-cooperative sequential rationality predicts one extreme outcome while the core (which coincides with the competitive market equilibrium) predicts the other extreme. Intermediate, disjoint outcomes are predicted by fairness utility models and the Shapley value. None of the four benchmarks fully explains the observed behavior. However, since elements of both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory are crucial for organizing our data, we conclude that effort towards bridging the gap between the various concepts is a promising approach for future economic research.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 425-445 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Psychology |
Volume | 24 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 2003 |
Keywords
- Backward induction
- Competition
- Experimental economics
- Game theory