The intrinsic value of risky prospects

Zeev Goldschmidt, Ittay Nissan-Rozen*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations


We study the representation of attitudes to risk in Jeffrey’s (The logic of decision, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965) decision-theoretic framework suggested by Stefánsson and Bradley (Philos Sci 82(4):602–625, 2015; Br J Philos Sci 70(1):77–102, 2017) and Bradley (Econ Philos 32(2):231–248, 2016; Decisions theory with a human face, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017). We show that on this representation, the value of any prospect may be expressed as a sum of two components, the prospect’s instrumental value (the value the prospect has only in virtue of the outcomes it might lead to) and the prospect’s intrinsic value (the value the prospect has only in virtue of the way it assigns different probabilities to the different outcomes). Both components have an expectational form. We also make a distinction between a prospect’s overall intrinsic value and a prospect’s conditional intrinsic value given each one of its possible outcomes and argue that this distinction has great explanatory power. We explore the relation between these two types of intrinsic values and show that they are determined at the level of preferences. Finally, we explore the relation between the intrinsic values of different prospects and point to a strong restriction on this relation that is implicit in Jeffrey’s axioms. We suggest a natural interpretation to this restriction.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)7553-7575
Number of pages23
Issue number8
StatePublished - Aug 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer Nature B.V.


  • Attitudes to risk
  • Chances
  • Decision theory
  • Richard Bradley
  • Richard Jeffrey
  • Risk aversion


Dive into the research topics of 'The intrinsic value of risky prospects'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this