Abstract
Contrary to what Cordelli argues, the relationship between Kantian legitimacy and democratic decision-making is contingent rather than necessary. This paper counters the connection between Kantian legitimacy and democracy in three ways: by arguing that democratic authorization is (i) not necessary, (ii) not sufficient, and indeed may be (iii) detrimental to, legitimate governance.
Original language | American English |
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Pages (from-to) | 243-250 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy |
Volume | 26 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2023 |
Bibliographical note
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Keywords
- Kant
- democracy
- legitimacy
- representation