The knowledge argument and higher-order properties

Amir Horowitz*, Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

The paper argues that Jackson's knowledge argument fails to undermine physicalist ontology. First, it is argued that, as this argument stands, it begs the question. Second, it is suggested that, by supplementing the argument (and taking one of its premises for granted), this flaw can be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against type-physicalism; however, this flaw cannot be remedied insofar as the argument is taken to be an argument against token-physicalism. The argument cannot be supplemented so as to show that experiences have properties which are illegitimate from a physicalist perspective.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)48-64
Number of pages17
JournalRatio
Volume18
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2005
Externally publishedYes

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