Abstract
In this paper (a sequel to ‘What Is Terrorism?’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 7 [1990]) I discuss both consequentialist and deontological justifications of terrorism. In the consequentialist context, I look in particular into Leon Trotsky’s classic defence of the ‘red terror’, based on the argument of continuity of war, revolution, and terrorism, and the claim that the distinction between the guilty and the innocent, combatants and noncombatants, is not relevant to modern warfare. On the deontological side, I discuss Virginia Held’s recent attempt at justifying terrorism in terms of basic human rights and distributive justice. The conclusion reached is that terrorism remains almost absolutely morally impermissible.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 221-233 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | Journal of Applied Philosophy |
Volume | 14 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Nov 1997 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© Society for Applied Philosophy, 1997.