The morality of terrorism

Igor Primoratz*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

36 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper (a sequel to ‘What Is Terrorism?’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 7 [1990]) I discuss both consequentialist and deontological justifications of terrorism. In the consequentialist context, I look in particular into Leon Trotsky’s classic defence of the ‘red terror’, based on the argument of continuity of war, revolution, and terrorism, and the claim that the distinction between the guilty and the innocent, combatants and noncombatants, is not relevant to modern warfare. On the deontological side, I discuss Virginia Held’s recent attempt at justifying terrorism in terms of basic human rights and distributive justice. The conclusion reached is that terrorism remains almost absolutely morally impermissible.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)221-233
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Applied Philosophy
Volume14
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Nov 1997

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Society for Applied Philosophy, 1997.

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