TY - JOUR
T1 - The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games
AU - Deb, Rajat
AU - Weber, Shlomo
AU - Winter, Eyal
PY - 1996
Y1 - 1996
N2 - Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of individuals, n, a finite set off alternatives, Ω, effective coalitions that must contain an a priori given number q of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where individuals are allowed to form groups of size q which are smaller than the grand coalition. Our main result determines the upper bound on the number of alternatives which would guarantee, for a given n and q, the existence of a stable coalition structure for any profile of complete transitive preference relations. Our notion of stability, script capital L sign-equilibrium, introduced by Greenberg-Weber (1993), combines both free entry and free mobility and represents the natural extension of the core to improper or non-superadditive games where coalition structures, and not only the grand coalition, are allowed to form.
AB - Abstract: This paper considers a model of society script capital L sign with a finite number of individuals, n, a finite set off alternatives, Ω, effective coalitions that must contain an a priori given number q of individuals. Its purpose is to extend the Nakamura Theorem (1979) to the quota games where individuals are allowed to form groups of size q which are smaller than the grand coalition. Our main result determines the upper bound on the number of alternatives which would guarantee, for a given n and q, the existence of a stable coalition structure for any profile of complete transitive preference relations. Our notion of stability, script capital L sign-equilibrium, introduced by Greenberg-Weber (1993), combines both free entry and free mobility and represents the natural extension of the core to improper or non-superadditive games where coalition structures, and not only the grand coalition, are allowed to form.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0030540661&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/BF01247101
DO - 10.1007/BF01247101
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AN - SCOPUS:0030540661
SN - 0020-7276
VL - 25
SP - 189
EP - 198
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
IS - 2
ER -