The necessity of idealism

Aaron Segal, Tyron Goldschmidt

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

This chapter formulates a version of idealism and argues for it. Sections 2 and 3 explicate this version of idealism: the world is mental through-and-through. Section 2 spells this out precisely and contrasts it with rival views. Section 3 draws a consequence from this formulation of idealism: idealism is necessarily true if true at all. Sections 4 and 5 make the case for idealism. Section 4 is defensive: it draws from the conclusion of section 3 to reply to a central, perhaps the central, anti-idealist argument. Section 5 is on the offense: it develops a new argument for idealism based on the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind. The contemporary debate in philosophy of mind has been dominated by physicalism and dualism, with idealism almost totally neglected. This chapter rectifies this situation.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationIdealism
Subtitle of host publicationNew Essays in Metaphysics
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages34-49
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)9780198746973
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2018

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© the several contributors 2017.

Keywords

  • Causal closure
  • Dualism
  • Idealism
  • Knowledge argument
  • Materialism
  • Parsimony

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