Abstract
This chapter formulates a version of idealism and argues for it. Sections 2 and 3 explicate this version of idealism: the world is mental through-and-through. Section 2 spells this out precisely and contrasts it with rival views. Section 3 draws a consequence from this formulation of idealism: idealism is necessarily true if true at all. Sections 4 and 5 make the case for idealism. Section 4 is defensive: it draws from the conclusion of section 3 to reply to a central, perhaps the central, anti-idealist argument. Section 5 is on the offense: it develops a new argument for idealism based on the contemporary debate in philosophy of mind. The contemporary debate in philosophy of mind has been dominated by physicalism and dualism, with idealism almost totally neglected. This chapter rectifies this situation.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Idealism |
Subtitle of host publication | New Essays in Metaphysics |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 34-49 |
Number of pages | 16 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780198746973 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2018 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© the several contributors 2017.
Keywords
- Causal closure
- Dualism
- Idealism
- Knowledge argument
- Materialism
- Parsimony