TY - JOUR
T1 - The optimal timing of procurement decisions and patent allocations
AU - Perry, Motty
AU - Vincent, Daniel R.
PY - 2002/11
Y1 - 2002/11
N2 - In a patent race, social incentives and private incentives may sometimes coincide and at other times diverge - too many researchers remain in the race. If the social planner cannot determine What stage the researchers have achieved, this informational constraint can result in a socially suboptimal outcome. We construct a mechanism in which a planner exploits the researchers' private information to determine when and to whom to allocate rights to pursue the final prize. This mechanism does not require any payments and, therefore, will not distort earlier investment incentives. It is solvable by the iterative elimination of dominated strategies.
AB - In a patent race, social incentives and private incentives may sometimes coincide and at other times diverge - too many researchers remain in the race. If the social planner cannot determine What stage the researchers have achieved, this informational constraint can result in a socially suboptimal outcome. We construct a mechanism in which a planner exploits the researchers' private information to determine when and to whom to allocate rights to pursue the final prize. This mechanism does not require any payments and, therefore, will not distort earlier investment incentives. It is solvable by the iterative elimination of dominated strategies.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0036851676&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00047
DO - 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00047
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AN - SCOPUS:0036851676
SN - 0020-6598
VL - 43
SP - 1035
EP - 1052
JO - International Economic Review
JF - International Economic Review
IS - 4
ER -