TY - JOUR
T1 - The pitfalls of implementing Host Community Compensation
T2 - A power balance perspective
AU - Klein, Ido
AU - Fischhendler, Itay
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd.
PY - 2015/12/1
Y1 - 2015/12/1
N2 - Siting national infrastructure is a challenge for planning institutions due to recurrent low public acceptance and opposition by civil society. The use of Host community compensation (HCC) presents a possible solution for this challenge. HCC is compensation that a developer provides to a community in return for the siting of infrastructure. Yet, despite wide support for HCC, many such initiatives seem to fail. Those that do manage to have a good start in reaching an agreement suffer from neglected implementation. This study examines the factors that affect the willingness of stakeholders to suggest, accept and later implement the use of HCC. The study argues that HCC is a continual process which should be implemented against the backdrop of changing interests and power balances between stakeholders. The evolving power balance between stakeholders is argued to critically influence the acceptability of HCC and its implementation. By examining a 40-year-long case of HCC along the Israeli coast, the study suggests that the power balance fluctuates along the years as a function of external variables such as resource scarcity and internal factors such as stakeholders' cohesion, leadership and skills. Different power balance settings yield different settings of willingness to offer, accept or implement HCC, each with its own HCC institutional design. However, once HCC is formed and designed, path dependency makes it much harder for civil society to repair a flawed HCC architecture.
AB - Siting national infrastructure is a challenge for planning institutions due to recurrent low public acceptance and opposition by civil society. The use of Host community compensation (HCC) presents a possible solution for this challenge. HCC is compensation that a developer provides to a community in return for the siting of infrastructure. Yet, despite wide support for HCC, many such initiatives seem to fail. Those that do manage to have a good start in reaching an agreement suffer from neglected implementation. This study examines the factors that affect the willingness of stakeholders to suggest, accept and later implement the use of HCC. The study argues that HCC is a continual process which should be implemented against the backdrop of changing interests and power balances between stakeholders. The evolving power balance between stakeholders is argued to critically influence the acceptability of HCC and its implementation. By examining a 40-year-long case of HCC along the Israeli coast, the study suggests that the power balance fluctuates along the years as a function of external variables such as resource scarcity and internal factors such as stakeholders' cohesion, leadership and skills. Different power balance settings yield different settings of willingness to offer, accept or implement HCC, each with its own HCC institutional design. However, once HCC is formed and designed, path dependency makes it much harder for civil society to repair a flawed HCC architecture.
KW - Host Community Compensation
KW - Israel
KW - NIMBY
KW - National infrastructure
KW - Power
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84941284060&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.07.012
DO - 10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.07.012
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AN - SCOPUS:84941284060
SN - 0264-8377
VL - 49
SP - 499
EP - 510
JO - Land Use Policy
JF - Land Use Policy
ER -