TY - JOUR
T1 - The positive value of information
AU - Neyman, Abraham
PY - 1991/8
Y1 - 1991/8
N2 - It has been remarked that in rational interactions more information to one player, while all others' information remains the same, may reduce his payoff in equilibrium. This classical observation relies on comparing equilibria of two different games. It is argued that this analysis is not tenably performed by comparing equilibria of two different games. Rather, one is compelled to perform the analysis in an interaction without complete information, and to compare equilibria of two interactions that are embedded in some compounded game. It is then shown that the player whose information is unilaterally refined cannot be worse off at equilibrium.
AB - It has been remarked that in rational interactions more information to one player, while all others' information remains the same, may reduce his payoff in equilibrium. This classical observation relies on comparing equilibria of two different games. It is argued that this analysis is not tenably performed by comparing equilibria of two different games. Rather, one is compelled to perform the analysis in an interaction without complete information, and to compare equilibria of two interactions that are embedded in some compounded game. It is then shown that the player whose information is unilaterally refined cannot be worse off at equilibrium.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0042469803&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90033-B
DO - 10.1016/0899-8256(91)90033-B
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AN - SCOPUS:0042469803
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 3
SP - 350
EP - 355
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 3
ER -